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NOTES
Constitutional Law: Establishment Clause v. Free
Expression: Adler v. Duval County School Board
L Introduction
Throughout the course of the 2000 presidential election campaign, Democratic
vice presidential nominee Joseph Lieberman, a prominent senator from Connec-
ticut, spoke frequently and passionately about the role of God in his life.'
President George W. Bush spoke of Jesus Christ as his favorite philosopher.2
Both men, along with many other politicians, discussed the power of prayer and
the need for more morality in our nation, and studies indicate this nation is quite
concerned about both a lack of religion and our collective morality.' While many
applaud this candor regarding the role of religion in Americans' lives, others are
troubled that government officials are so open and uninhibited about revealing and
promoting their religious beliefs." It seems illogical that while the law requires
some form of separation between church and state, those who seek election to the
government by the American people would be oblivious to the First Amendment.
Yet these politicians may be mirroring what society sees everyday: a struggle to
determine what role, if any, religion should play in our nation's governmental
entities. Perhaps this struggle is fiercest when it concerns children in our nation's
public schools.
For nearly forty years, since the U.S. Supreme Court first considered public
school prayer in the case of Engel v. Vitale,5 our nation's judicial system has
struggled in addressing one of our society's most deeply rooted traditions; it has
attempted to reconcile the conflicting protections of free speech and the separation
of church and state. Few issues have spawned such emotion, passion, and
disagreement as prayer in public schools." Recently, the Court once again
1. Kenneth L. Woodward, Does God Belong on the Stump?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2000, at 54, 54.
2. Howard Fineman, Praying to Win: The Team: Religion Is a Hot Ticket in This Year's Race, and
Gore Hopes Joe Lieberman Can Give His Cause a Great Awakening. Al's Test of Faith - and of
Leadership, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 2000, at 18, 18.
3. Jane Lampman, America Sees Moral Shortfall, Looks to Faith Poll: Reaffirms the Concept of'One
Nation, Under God,' with People Viewing More Religion as the Antidote to Social Ills, CHRIsTAN Sci.
MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2001, at 3.
4. Woodward, supra note 1, at 55.
5. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
6. Cf. Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion
in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535, 1542 (1995) (stating that since the inception of the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause has been a source of contention, especially when applied to public
education).
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attempted to clarify the legal boundaries of public-school prayer in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe.
The latest public-school prayer case to capture the national spotlight, Adler v.
Duval County School Board,8 came out of the Eleventh Circuit. Adler involved
a school district policy that grants high school seniors the discretion to decide if
they want a graduating senior to deliver an opening or closing message at the
graduation ceremony, and if so, to choose the graduating speaker.9 The school
district and its employees cannot monitor or review the selected student's message
or its content. 10
This note analyzes whether the Duval County School Board policy is
constitutional. Part II of this note traces the relevant law prior to the Adler case,
including both Establishment Clause cases and student free-expression cases. Part
III examines how the Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion in Adler and
analyzes whether the Adler decision is consistent with the previous case law. In
Part IV, the note analyzes Adler and draws four main conclusions: (1) that the
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence needs to be revamped; (2) that the
Supreme Court should look to the history and tradition of government practices
and adopt the Endorsement Test; (3) that even under the current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Adler is constitutional; (4) that the current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is in such disarray that it is futile to predict how it affects
Oklahoma.
II. Law Prior to the Case
A. Establishment Clause Concerns in Public Schools
The First Amendment of our Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievan-
ces."" The first clause of the First Amendment contains two subclauses: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. This note's analysis of prayer
in public school implicates the Establishment Clause. 2
The Supreme Court first considered the effect of the Establishment Clause on
our nation's public schools in Everson v. Board of Education.3 In Everson, the
Court found that the Establishment Clause applied both to the federal government
and to the states." Everson involved a statute allowing school boards to
7. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
8. 206 F.3d 1070 (1lth Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), affid, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir.
2001).
9. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001).
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
12. Kevin E. Broyles, Recent Development, Establishment of Religion and High School Graduation
Ceremonies: Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 279 (1993).
13. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).




reimburse families for the costs of transporting their children to school.'" A
taxpayer challenged the statute's provision allowing reimbursement for parents
who chose to send their children to parochial schools.'6 The Court found the
statute to be constitutional, despite the partition that must be kept between
religion and government. 7
The Court first addressed the issue of public-school prayer in Engel v. Vitale.
Engel involved the daily reading of a state-written prayer at a public school in
New York.'" It found the prayer reading to be unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause, holding that "in this country it is no part of the business
of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."'9 While
Engel resolved the immediate situation, it failed to provide a doctrine for future
Establishment Clause conflicts.
The next major development in the Establishment Clause controversy occurred
in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.' This landmark decision created the much-
discussed Lemon test, which was the Court's attempt at defining a constitutional
standard for governmental involvement with religion.' Lemon involved
taxpayers' challenges of similar statutes in two different states, both of which
provided public financial assistance to private, parochial schools.' The Court
found both statutes to be unconstitutional violations of the Establishment
Clause.'
In its decision, the Lemon Court outlined a three-part test to determine whether
a statute is constitutional under the Establishment Clause. "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'" With the Lemon test in
place, it seemed as though the nation had a consistent doctrine for addressing
Establishment Clause concerns.
The Supreme Court, however, was not finished with its handiwork. The Court
once again considered the issue of school prayer in Lee v, Weisman.' Lee
involved a public-school graduation ceremony at which the principal invited a
member of the clergy to deliver a neutral prayer. Although the lower court in
Fourteenth Amendment. Il
15. 1& at 3.
16. Id. at 3.4.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-23 (1962).
19. Id. at 425.
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. Bila, supra note 6, at 1538.
22. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
23. Id. at 607.
24. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
25. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
26. Id. at 581. "Neutral prayer" refers to prayer in which the religious message is not devoted to
any particular religion; rather, it is nonsectarian. In Lee, the principal gave a pamphlet to the speaker
2001]
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Lee attempted to use the Lemon test to reach a decision, the Supreme Court
forged a new standard and determined that the school prayer in question was an
Establishment Clause violation.27 It held that two dominant facts rendered the
school's graduation prayer unconstitutional: first, a state actor (the principal)
requested the prayer and gave instructions as to the content of the prayer; and
second, the graduation ceremony (and consequently the prayer) was a mandatory
public event, even if students were not technically obliged to attend.2'
Recently, the Court once again examined public-school prayer in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, a case involving prayer at high school
football games." In Santa Fe, a school permitted students to hold two separate
elections: the first determined whether a nonsectarian prayer or message should
be delivered at high school football games, and the second determined which
students would deliver the invocations." Looking to the principles established
in Lee, the Court found the policy to be an unconstitutional violation of the
Establishment Clause.3 First, it found the school district's policy of allowing
students to elect a student to give a prayer to be an official state action violative
of the Establishment Clause.32 Second, it found that while a high school football
game may not be a mandatory event for all students, certain students, including
the team, the band, and the cheerleaders, must attend.33 Moreover, the Court
concluded that even if the game is a voluntary event, it still coerces all present
to participate in religious worship, a situation that violates Lee.'
The Court's decisions, while less than clear, do suggest a trend. Some limited
forms of religious expression and involvement appear to be permissible, even in
public schools, so long as the State does not endorse the expression. Lee clearly
states, "Our jurisprudence in this area is of necessity one of line-drawing, of
determining at what point a dissenter's rights of religious freedom are infringed
by the State. 35
B. The Tenth Circuit and the Establishment Clause
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases demonstrate that the interpretation
of the doctrine of separation of church and state can vary dramatically, depending
on the particular facts at issue. The Tenth Circuit considered the role of the
explaining appropriate standards for a prayer delivered in public. Id.
27. Id. at 585-86. The Court made it very clear, however, that it would not reconsider the decision
in Lemon. Id. at 587.
28. id. at 586. The Court reasoned that although a school could not require attendance at a
graduation ceremony, public and personal expectations have the effect of compelling students to attend.
Id. at 594-95.
29. 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
30. Id. at 297. Although the school's policies regarding prayer changed several times, the policy
described represents the final policy in place at the time the Court considered the issue. L at 294-98.
31. Id. at 301.
32. Id. at 310-11.
33. Id. at 311.
34. Id. at 312.




Establishment Clause in public schools in Lanner v. Wimmer.' Lanner involved
a state policy allowing students to take religion classes off-campus during regular
school hours. 7 Applying Lemon, the court held that the overall policy did not
violate the Establishment Clause' However, the court did conclude that two
provisions of the policy contravened the Establishment Clause: (1) requiring the
public school to regulate attendance of the students in the religion class; and (2)
awarding school credit for the religion class. 9
The Tenth Circuit once again considered an Establishment Clause question in
Roberts v. Madigan."' In Roberts, a principal ordered a teacher in her school to
keep two religious books as well as the Bible out of public view during regular
classroom hours.4 ' The teacher challenged the principal's command.42 Once
again, the court applied the Lemon test. The court concluded that the principal's
order to remove the books was constitutional under the Establishment Clause,
since a public school has to maintain its secular purpose and ensure that religion
is not taught in the school.43 While the teacher argued that the principal's order
was content-based discrimination and a violation of the teacher's First Amendment
rights, the court held that removal of the books did not constitute a disapproval
of Christianity and that, based on the facts, there was "no reason . . . to draw a
distinction between teachers and students where classroom expression is
concerned.""
The Tenth Circuit continued its Establishment Clause jurisprudence in
Bauchman v. West High School.45 In this case, a Jewish student sued her school
because the choir, of which she was a member, sang predominantly Christian
songs and performed at religious locations.46 In a familiar pattern, the Tenth
Circuit first looked to Lemon to determine the law.47 The court held that the
choir's songs and performance locations did not violate the Establishment Clause,
that the singing of religious songs did not constitute a coercion of religious
36. 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
37. Id. at 1351. While the court stated that some Protestant churches offered courses, it also
indicated that a vast majority of the classes were part of a seminary program offered by the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Id. at 1354.
38. Id. at 1359.
39. Id.
40. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
41. Id. at 1049-50.
42. Id. at 1050.
43. Id. at 1054.
44. Id. at 1054-58.
45. 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997).
46. Id. at 546. The objectionable song lyrics included those that "sing praise to 'Jesus Christ our
savior' and 'Jesus Christ our Lord,' and that includefd] other devotional references to God." d. at 553.
Performance locations included several Christian churches and religious sites, such as "the Church of the
Madeleine, the First Presbyterian Church and Temple Square." Id.
47. Id. at 551. In fact, the court concluded that because singing religious songs does not constitute
prayer, the Lee test of coercion did not apply. Id. at 552 & n.8.
20011
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activity analogous to school prayer, and that the singing did not constitute a
violation of the student's right to free speech.4'
C. Oklahoma and the Establishment Clause
The most relevant Oklahoma case discussing the Establishment Clause and
prayer is Martinez v. State.49 In Martinez, a defendant was convicted of two
counts of first degree murder." On appeal, the defendant alleged that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to a prayer
by the trial judge."' The court did not find the judge's prayer to be reversible
error because the trial judge offered an opportunity for both sides to object to the
prayer, and because the defendant agreed to the prayer. 2 However, the Ok-
lahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did warn other courts that they should refrain
from offering prayers in the future, especially in criminal trials, due to the
possibility of creating trial errors. 3
D. Free Expression of Students; Public Schools- as Public Forums
While the Establishment Clause plays a significant role in determining whether
the Adler policy is constitutional, students' First Amendment rights to free speech
and expression also must be considered. The seminal case on students' right of
free speech is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.'
In Tinker, students chose to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands." The school administration, fearing the students' actions would lead
to disruptions in school, enacted a policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands;
students who violated the policy were suspended until they complied with it.'
The Court held that the policy was an unconstitutional violation of the students'
First Amendment right to free speech." Tinker also established a rule for schools
to follow when attempting to prohibit free expression:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and
48. Id. at 550-58.
49. 1999 OK CR 33, 984 P.2d 813.
50. Id. 1, 984 P.2d at 817.
51. Id. 1 51, 984 P.2d at 827.
52. Id. 9 52-54, 984 P.2d at 827.
53. Id TI 55-59, 984 P.2d at 827-29.
54. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
55. Id at 504.
56. Id.




substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained."
Absent the aforementioned criteria, the Court concluded that "students are entitled
to freedom of expression of their views.' 59 Tinker's ruling seemed to provide
students with considerable freedom of expression. However, Tinker has been
limited by the Court on notable occasions. Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser' considered Tinker's interpretive boundaries. In Fraser, the Court held
that schools have the discretion to limit and define what constitutes offensive
speech within the schools.6 Fraser involved a sexually related speech given by
a student at a school assembly.62 The student gave the speech despite a school
policy banning the use of obscene language in the school.63 In finding that the
school could punish the student for the offensive content of his speech, the Court
reasoned that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial
views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's counter-
vailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior."" It found the students' expression in Tinker, which involved political
speech, incomparable to the lewd and vulgar expression at issue in the present
case." The Court also reasoned that while adults may have the constitutional
right to certain freedoms, such as offensive speech, not all of these freedoms
extend into the public schools.' Significantly, however, the Court did not define
what type of speech should be considered offensive; rather, it left such decisions
to the local school boards around the country.'
The Court further explored a school's role in regulating students' speech in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier." Looking to Fraser, the Kuhlmeier
58. Id at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
59. ld. at 511.
60. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
61. Id at 683.
62. Id at 677-78. The student delivered the speech while nominating a fellow student. Id. at 677.
For those who never tire of juvenile antics, here is the text of the speech (which was published only in
the concurring opinion, presumably because the majority found it too offensive for print):
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and every one
of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - hell never come between you and the best
our high school can he.
id. at 687.
63. Id at 678.
64. Id at 681.
65. Id at 685.
66. Id at 682.
67. Id. at 683-85.
68. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
2001]
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Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." '69 Kuhlmeier involved a principal's removal of two pages
from a school-sponsored student newspaper." Finding the principal's actions to
be constitutionally acceptable, the Court reasoned that the school did not intend
for the newspaper to serve as an open public forum; rather, the newspaper served
as an educational vehicle that was part of a classroom curriculum' As such, the
school maintained a much higher level of control over the content of the student
newspaper than it would have if the newspaper were a designated public forum."
While school officials can control free expression in schools, they must
consider whether the speech occurs in a public forum. In Perry Education Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 3 the Court analyzed how much control the
government can have over speech based upon the public forum in which it is
spoken. 4 Perry examined the three levels of public forums; each level becomes
increasingly subject to governmental control." The first level is the traditional
public forum, such as a street or a park. 6 In such a forum, "the government may
not prohibit all communicative activity."77 For the State to limit speech based on
content, the limitation must pass the test of strict scrutiny."' Additionally, the
government can "enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression
which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."79 The
second type of forum "consists of public property which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity."" In this type of forum, the
government need not designate the public property as an open forum; however,
once it has done so, the government must abide by the same content requirements
and time, place, and manner requirements placed upon a traditional public forum
for as long as the government designates the public property as an open forum."'
69. Id. at 273.
70. Id. at 264.
71. Id. at 267-70.
72. Id. at 269-70.
73. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
74. Id. at 44.
75. Id. at 45-47.
76. Id. at 45.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Perry Court specifically stated that "[flor the state to enforce a content-based exclusion
it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowyak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219
(1984).
79. Perry, 460 U.S. at'45.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 45-46; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (finding that a public school committed unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by denying a




The third type of forum consists of public property that is not an open forum by
either tradition or designation.'" This third type of forum is subject to different
standards than the previous two: "[I]n addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, com-
municative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view.""
The courts seem to provide a basic framework for how religion and free speech
should be handled in our public schools. The Constitution permits some religion
within the walls of the public school, but not too much. Public school students
have a right to speak freely and express their views in the schoolhouse, so long
as it is within a public forum and within certain limitations of school-defined
public decency. These basic guidelines, however, provide little solace for those
who must attempt to conform to the mandates of the Constitution. It seems
unreasonable to assume that most teachers, principals, superintendents, and school
board members are legal experts; yet, they must hazard a guess at what the
Constitution and the law requires. Certainly, if the Supreme Court of the United
States cannot produce a clear policy, public school administrations may not be
able to do so. This area of the law has been relegated to fact-specific analyses,
yet the courts assert that they are applying the law in a consistent fashion, using
a clear doctrine.
II. Adler v. Duval County School Board
A. Facts
The Duval' County School District traditionally included a prayer or religious
message at its high school graduation ceremonies." However, after the Lee
decision, the Duval County superintendent determined that no prayers or similar
messages should be delivered at commencement exercises.s Many in the
community contacted the superintendent to discuss the new graduation policy, and
some suggested that the school district should not be involved in the decision of
whether to have a graduation prayer."
nonreligious groups to use school facilities); Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263,267-69 (1981) (holding
that a state university that made its facilities generally available to student groups had designated such
facilities as public forums, and could not discriminate or exclude certain student groups unless meeting
the constitutional standards for traditional or designated public forums).
82. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
83. Id. The Court in Perry found that teachers' mailboxes in a public school fell within the third
type of forum. Therefore, a restriction that allowed only one labor union access to the mailboxes was
permitted to stand, since the other unions could still communicate with teachers on school property, post
notices on school bulletin boards, and make announcements on the public-address system. See id. at 53.
84. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1071 (11 th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S.
801 (2000), affd, 250 F.3d 1330 (11 th Cir. 2001).
85. Adler, 206 F.3d at 1071.
86. Id. at 1071-72.
2001]
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Thereafter, the superintendent, in conjunction with the school district's legal-
affairs officer, issued a new policy in a memorandum entitled "Graduation
Prayers.""' The memorandum stated that the Lee decision had caused confusion
for school districts regarding prayer, and the memorandum aimed to provide
guidelines for administrators whose students may wish to have an opening and/or
closing graduation message given by a student." The guidelines in the memoran-
dum read as follows:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed
two minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the
discretion of the graduating senior class;
2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student
volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating
senior class as a whole;
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or
closing message, the content of that message shall be prepared by the
student volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by
the Duval County School Board [sic], its officers or employees;
The purpose of these guidelines is to allow students to direct their
own graduation message without monitoring or review by school
officials. 9
In 1993, the first year of the new policy, ten of seventeen high schools within
the school district had religious messages delivered at their commencement
exercises,"° At the remaining seven graduations, the students either elected not
to have a student speaker, or the student speakers delivered nonreligious
messages. '
B. Procedural History
In June 1993, students within the school district filed a class action suit against
the Duval County School Board, alleging the board's newest policy violated both
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.92 The district court
refused to certify the students as a class and granted summary judgment in favor
of the school board.93 Following summary judgment, the students appealed to a
panel of the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled that because all of the protesting
87. Id. at 1072.
88. Id.
89. Id. (alteration in original).
90. Id.
91. Id. (alteration in original) (setting forth the text of the memorandum). The Court observed that
following 1993, statistics were not available to determine who spoke and what they said at subsequent
graduation ceremonies. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1072-73. The original district court opinion can be found at Adler v. Duval County School




students had graduated, their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were
moot."
In May 1998, a new group of students brought suit against the Duval County
School Board, arguing the same constitutional infringements as the students did
in the prior action and seeking essentially the same remedies." The protesting
students contended (1) that the policy attempted to dodge the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in Lee; (2) that the policy had a primarily religious purpose
because it was entitled "Graduation Prayer;" and (3) that some school board
members made comments about school prayer demonstrating that the primary
purpose of the policy was religious.96 The district court denied the motion and
entered final judgment for the school board. 7 Upon appeal, a panel of the
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment, whereupon
the full Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc'
On rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit held the school policy was constitutional."
The students consequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted a
writ of certiorari."° The Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and
remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its
decision in Santa Fe." On remand, the Eleventh Circuit again held that the
school policy was constitutional."°
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was again challenged, but this time the Supreme
Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari, effectively upholding the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. 03
C. Issue
The Eleventh Circuit stated the issue as "[w]hether the Duval County school
system's policy of permitting a graduating student, elected by her class, to deliver
an unrestricted message of her choice at the beginning and/or closing of
graduation ceremonies is facially violative of the Establishment Clause."'"
94. Adler, 206 F.3d at 1073. The Eleventh Circuit panel's opinion is designated as Adler v. Duval
County School Board, 112 F.3d 1475 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
95. Adler, 206 F.3d at 1073.
96. Id at 1085.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1073.
99. I at 1074-75.
100. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
101. d
102. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1lth Cir. 2001).
103. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 122 S. Ct. 664 (2001).
104. Adler, 206 F.3d at 1073. Interestingly, the court only considered that policy's constitutionality
under the Establishment Clause and not the Free Exercise Clause, despite the protesting students'
assertions that the policy violated both.
20011
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D. Holding
In the original opinion from the Eleventh Circuit, the Adler court held that
under both Lemon and Lee, the school board's policy was constitutional. 5
Looking first to Lee, the court found that based on the Duval County graduation
policy, a student speaker's message could not be considered a message endorsed
by the State.10 The Adler court also declared that there was no governmental
coercion of the graduation message; therefore, the facts did not meet either
element of the Lee analysis.0" Using the Lemon test, the court held (1) the
graduation policy had a secular purpose; (2) the policy did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion; and (3) the policy did not excessively entangle
government with religion."u
E. Reasoning
1. Application of Lee v. Weisman
The Eleventh Circuit found Adler to be readily distinguishable from Lee. The
Adler court stated that in Lee, "[there can be little doubt ... [that the] school
system ordained and established a religious exercise at a graduation ceremony,
and that the graduation prayer. . . was in every sense endorsed and supported by
the state."'" The Adler court reasoned:
[I]n striking contrast, under the Duval County graduation policy,
however, neither the School Board nor its principals may ordain,
direct, establish, or endorse a religious prayer or message of any
kind. . . . The Duval County policy explicitly divorces school
officials from the decision-making process as to whether any
message - be it religious or not - may be delivered at graduation
at all. Moreover, decisional control over the most crucial elements of
the graduation policy rests with the students and not the state."'
The Adler court additionally reasoned that Lee did not mean to exclude all
religion, even private religious exercise, from graduation ceremonies; rather, the
court asserted that Lee simply required neutrality on the part of the
government."' The court determined that "the policy can be analogized to a line
of open forum cases in which the Supreme Court has held that neutral secular
policies that merely accommodate religion or individual free exercise rights do not
amount to an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion... Additionally, the
105. Id. at 1075.
106. Id. at 1082-83.
107. 1d at 1083-84.
108. Id. at 1084-90.
109. Id. at 1076.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1076-77.




court made it clear that state neutrality towards religion must be distinguished
from government hostility towards religion, and the government risks
constitutional impingement by attempting to prevent someone from exercising his
First Amendment right to free speech."'
Continuing its analysis of the school policy under Lee, the Adler court reasoned
that while the school may sponsor the graduation ceremony, this hardly means
that religious speech at the ceremony is attributable to the State."" The court
pointed out that in Lee, the Court did not find the graduation policy un-
constitutional because religious speech occurred at a graduation sponsored by the
State. Rather, the Lee Court found the school policy unconstitutional because
state actors (i.e., the school administration) selected speakers to deliver an
invocation or prayer.1 '5 Furthermore, the state actors even gave pamphlets to
designated religious speakers in an attempt to control what those speakers
said."6 The Adler policy is clearly distinguishable, according to the court,
because student speakers are not state actors." 7 The Adler court readily
acknowledged that a student selected under the Duval County policy may
potentially use offensive speech while on stage at the graduation ceremony, but
found that "[t]he occasional tolerance of speech we may deem offensive is one
price we pay for the First Amendment and our democratic traditions."".
Finally, the court rejected the contention that the school's policy of allowing
students to decide upon a graduation speaker transformed the designated student's
message into one endorsed by the State. "' The court reasoned that the chosen
speaker is a "representative of the student body, not an official of the state."'12
The court concluded that for the elected speaker to be considered a state actor,
each individual high school student would also have to be considered a state
actor, a premise the court found to be untenable.'2'
2. Application of Lemon v. Kurtzman
The Adler court next analyzed the school policy under the Lemon test. Looking
to Lemon's first prong, which requires a statute to be primarily secular, the court
reasoned that the graduation policy serves three primary secular purposes: (1) It
provides students with an opportunity to plan their own graduation ceremony; (2)
It allows students to solemnize the graduation; and (3) It permits students'
freedom of expression." The court also made it clear that Lemon's first prong
113. IU at 1078-79.
114. Id at 1080.
115. Id. at 1080-81.
116. lit
117. Id. at 1081.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1082. The court found that when a student is selected neutrally, is selected in a secular
manner, and has total control over the content of her speech, then speech is her own. Id at 1083.
121. Id. at 1082.
122. Id. at 1085.
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can be fulfilled even if the act in question is partially motivated by a religious
purpose, if the policy is primarily motivated by a secular purpose."
The court proceeded to analyze the policy under the second prong of Lemon,
which requires that the principal effect of a statute be one that neither advances
nor restricts religion.24 The court reasoned that because the policy allows the
student freedom to choose a topic without state interference, the policy satisfied
the second prong." The court stressed that the policy "is content-neutral and
does not mandate or even encourage that a graduation prayer will be uttered."'2 6
Finally, the court found that the policy fulfilled the third requirement of Lemon,
which forbids the excessive entanglement of government and religion.'2' The
court found that the essence of the policy represented a lack of entanglement
between government and religion because the school could not review the
student's message at all." The court emphasized that "the School Board would
find itself far more entangled with religion if it attempted to eradicate all religious
content from student messages than if it maintained a meaningful policy of
studied neutrality."'2
F. Dissent
The Adler dissenting opinion expressed the most concern with the majority's
"unwillingness to look beyond the policy's terms.'" 3 The dissent suggested that
Lemon is the appropriate test for the school's policy, but that the policy does not
withstand the three-prong test. 3' The dissent argued that the "policy runs afoul
of the Lemon test because its only credible purpose is to maximize the chance that
prayer will continue to play a prominent role in Duval County graduations.
Furthermore, the policy's 'primary effect' is to advance religion."'3
The dissent then looked to Lee and found the facts in Adler similar to the facts
in Lee."' The dissent argued that while state control may not be as prevalent in
the Adler situation, the majority still blindly ignored the reality that a student
speaker would not be at the graduation but for the State's action of facilitating a
student election." The dissent found it significant that while the government
123. Id. at 1084.
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
125. Adler, 206 F.3d at 1089.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1090.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1091 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1091-92 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). For some reason, perhaps because the majority opinion
applied Lee, the dissent felt obliged to apply Lee to the facts of the case even after asserting that Lemon
was the appropriate standard.




gave a small portion of the graduation planning authority to the students, it
"retain[ed] ultimate control over the larger operation." ''
G. The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion on Remand
After the Supreme Court remanded the case, the Eleventh Circuit issued a new
opinion that again affirmed the school district's policy as constitutional.'" Per
the Court's instructions to consider Adler in light of the Court's Santa Fe
decision, '37 the Eleventh Circuit compared the policies in the two cases and
found them readily distinguishable."'3 After reviewing its Lee and Lemon
analyses from its first decision, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the Santa Fe
decision and found Adler distinguishable for two primary reasons: first, the school
district in Santa Fe directly controlled the content of the speech, whereas the
school district in Adler had no control over the content of the student's speech;
and second, the Santa Fe policy invited religious messages exclusively, while the
Adler policy invited any message that the student speaker wished to give,
regardless of viewpoint or content.'" The Adler court stressed that the sole
purpose of the Santa Fe policy was to decide whether to elect a religious speaker,
a primarily religious purpose.'" Conversely, the court found the Adler policy
to be "entirely neutral regarding whether a message is to be given, and if a
message is to be given, the content of that message." '4'
The Adler court also explained several other reasons why its prior decision
should be affirmed. First, it argued that Santa Fe did not provide any new rule
of law; to the contrary, it used "the very same framework of Lee and Lemon that
[it] applied in [its] prior decision."'4 " Second, it pointed out that the Court's
Santa Fe decision "did not rule that an election process itself is always
incompatible with the Establishment Clause. Nor did it rule that a student elected
to speak to the student body is necessarily a state-sponsored speaker."'43 Third,
the court stressed Santa Fe's assertion that speech becomes state sponsored when
the government controls the content of the speech, not simply because the speech
is "'authorized by a government policy and t[akes] place on government property
at a government-sponsored school-related event.""" Fourth, the court noted that
regardless of the Adler school board's intent in passing the new graduation policy,
the court should only concern itself with the facial constitutionality of the
135. Id. at 1094 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
136. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1lth Cir. 2001).
137. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
138. Adler, 250 F.3d at 1332.
139. id at 1336-40.
140. Id. at 1340. Any government action failing to have a primarily secular purpose should fail the
Lemon test. See Lemon v. Kurtzmnan, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
141. Adler, 250 F.3d at 1337.
142. Id at 1340.
143. Id. at 1340-41.
144. Id. at 1341 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000)).
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language; the Eleventh Circuit did find the policy constitutional on its face. 14
Finally, the court reasserted that the Adler policy promoted three legitimate
secular purposes: (1) solemnization of the graduation, (2) allowing students a
chance to control their own graduation ceremony, and (3) enhancing a student's
right to freedom of speech and expression." The Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari on this opinion.'47
IV. Analysis of the Adler Decision
Based on the history of prayer in public schools in conjunction with the
aforementioned courts' analyses of the Establishment Clause and public forums,
it seems quite unclear what the actual rule of law is. Rather than attempt to
continue onward with a series of holdings that judges can easily manipulate and
distinguish based upon their individual viewpoints, the U.S. Supreme Court should
have reconsidered its Establishment Clause doctrines. One can draw several
conclusions from the Adler case, especially when one considers that this case is
the latest in a long line of public-school prayer cases: (1) The current Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence is nothing more than ad hoc balancing by the courts,
leaving the courts free to rule on the Establishment Clause as they wish based
upon their own viewpoints; (2) The Court should adopt a new standard for dealing
with the Establishment Clause; (3) The Court correctly found the policy in Adler
to be constitutional; and (4) It is difficult to determine how Oklahoma courts
would rule on a policy similar to that in Adler.
A. Ad Hoc: Courts Have Yet to Fashion a Workable Establishment Clause
Doctrine
At the very least, it seems clear that the United States court system has failed
to produce a consistent, workable Establishment Clause doctrine. While the
Supreme Court has been able to establish a basic view of how church and state
should be reconciled in our society,"4M this "basic view" has little value when
applied to a specific set of facts.
For instance, in Everson v. Board of Education, the Court held that the
Establishment Clause requires 'a wall of separation between Church and
State""' 9 in this country, and that such a wall "must be kept high and impreg-
nable."" Such a basic view may seem based upon constitutional language.
However, in sustaining a school transportation funding policy that benefitted
students in both public and private schools, the Court explained that such a wall
145. Id
146. Id. at 1334, 1342; see also Adler v. Duval County Bd. of Educ., 206 F.3d 1070, 1085 (1 1th
Cir. 2000) (listing the Eleventh Circuit's findings of the three secular purposes of the policy in question).
147. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 122 S. Ct. 664 (2001).
148. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. Id at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).




was not absolute.' In defining its Establishment Clause view, the Everson
Court reasoned that the government could not establish an official church, benefit
a particular faith, or even pass a law to benefit all religions." By the same
token, the Court also noted that the government could not discourage or inhibit
religious beliefs, including the exercise of them.'53 Therefore, in its very first
attempt at fashioning a doctrine for the Establishment Clause as it relates to
public schools, the Court spoke of strict divisions, yet granted exceptions to such
divisions for "public welfare legislation.""'U The Court specifically mentioned
transportation, utilities, and police and fire protection as the types of government
services that should not be subject to the mighty "wall" that must exist between
church and state.s
Everson was only the beginning of the court system's problems with the
Establishment Clause. The Lemon Court, in its attempt to create a sustainable
doctrine, admitted the difficulty of developing a standard, stating, "[W]e can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law."'" The Court reasoned, "Our prior holdings do not call for
total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an
absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations
is inevitable."'" In fact, the Court even addressed past use of the image of a
"wall"'5 between church and state by declaring "that the line of separation, far
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship."'" Lemon constituted the Court's
recognition that no simple doctrine would adequately handle the Establishment
Clause; on the contrary, Lemon suggests that no one doctrine is capable of
addressing the multidimensional relationship between church and state, particular-
ly when applied to our nation's public schools.
The Court continues to struggle with the Establishment Clause, admitting that
it cannot limit Establishment Clause questions to "any single test or criterion."'"
One Justice has declared that the Court's Establishment Clause rulings are in
"hopeless disarray."'' Another pronounced that the Establishment Clause
holdings are in need of "[s]ubstantial revision."'"
The test established in Lee v. Weisman hardly constitutes a breakthrough. To
the contrary, it could be argued that Lee's holding makes matters worse because
151. l at 17.
152. 1.k at 15-16.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 16.
155. Id. at 16-17.
156. Lemon v. Kurtzan, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
157. let at 614.
158. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
159. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
160. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984).
161. Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
162. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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it requires courts to look at two tests: both Lemon and Lee. In fact, the Adler
court faced such a predicament. Rather than guessing as to the appropriate
standard, the court in Adler analyzed the facts using both Lemon and Lee.'63
This leads to confusing, and as of yet, unresolved issues. Should Lee only apply
to public-school prayer cases? Can a school board choose which doctrine it would
like to utilize, or must it consider both? As a corollary, what if a school's policy
fulfills the dictates of one of the two policies, but not the other?
Lee seems to signify that the Court cannot create one consistent Establishment
Clause doctrine. Rather, the Court appears to be making Establishment Clause
rulings on an ad hoc basis. The Supreme Court case of Marsh v. Chambers"s
reinforces this theory. In Marsh, the Court considered a challenge to the
constitutionality of a prayer that opened each legislative day of the Nebraska
legislature; a taxpayer-funded chaplain delivered the prayer. 5 Admittedly, the
Court decided this case before it decided Lee, so, understandably, the Court did
not consider the Lee test to determine the outcome of Marsh. What is perplexing
is why the Court disregarded Lemon and found the Nebraska prayer constitutional.
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Lemon and found the prayer
to be unconstitutional under the Lemon standard." The Court chose to disregard
Lemon, however, considering instead that "[t]he opening of sessions of legislative
and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history
and tradition of this country."167 The Court pointed out that the First Congress
appointed chaplains in both the House and Senate to deliver prayers.'" The
Court reasoned that "[clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion
Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation
of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued
without interruption ever since that early session of Congress."''" The Court did
attempt to qualify its holding:
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary
violations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than
simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds
light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment
Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to
the practice authorized by the First Congress - their actions reveal
their intent.'
163. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000).
164. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
165. Id. at 784.
166. Id. at 785-86.
167. Id. at 786.
168. Id. at 787-88.
169. Id. at 788.




The Court also acknowledged that at least two Founding Fathers opposed prayer
in the Continental Congress."' The Court reasoned that this fact demonstrated
that the Founding Fathers specifically considered the issue of prayer and found
it to be constitutional, even when differing religious views existed among those
present." The Court did qualify its holding by asserting that this matter
involves adults, who are not easily impressionable or subject to peer pressure.'73
In Marsh, it seems the Court did not wish to overturn the historic and
seemingly popular practice of legislative prayer that occurs all around the nation,
including the U.S. Congress; therefore, the Court chose to disregard Lemon. The
Court justified the decision by the age of the prayer participants, but this seems
a feeble argument. The Lemon standard does not include a requirement that it
only be applied to matters affecting those under the age of eighteen. 74 While
Marsh provides another example of the indeterminate nature of Establishment
Clause doctrine, it also further darkens the already muddied waters of current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For instance, the Tenth Circuit used Marsh
as the basis for its holding in Snyder v. Murray City Corp." This case involved
a city council that held a prayer before the opening of every meeting. 76 In
Murray, the city council decided to deny a specific individual the right to deliver
his prayer, based on the content of his message." The Tenth Circuit approved
the city council's decision, asserting that if a legislative body has the right to have
a prayer delivered, it should have the right to decide who should deliver the
prayer.' The Tenth Circuit, like the Supreme Court, seemed unconcerned about
Lemon or Lee, which the Supreme Court had decided at the time of this case."
One need only look to the long line of Establishment Clause cases, only some
of which this note mentions, to realize that the Court's handiwork has proved
unsuccessful. This creates significant problems because school officials who wish
to create policies that conform with the Establishment Clause are not sure how
to do so. In Adler, the Duval County School Board intentionally changed its
policy in hopes of reflecting the law announced in Lee." By attempting to
conform its policy with the Court's latest standard, the school district actually
exposed itself to liability.
The Court's actions also create frustration because the Court deems some forms
of religious expression appropriate within public schools. The Court has refused
to declare that all religious interaction is inappropriate; rather, it has realistically
171. Id. at 791.
172. Id. at 791-92.
173. Id. at 792.
174. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
175. 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).
176. Id. at 1228.
177. Id. at 1228-29.
178. Id. at 1232-34.
179. Id. at 1231.
180. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (1 1th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S.
801 (2000), affd, 250 F.3d 1330 (1lth Cir. 2001).
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acknowledged that some interaction between church and state is inevitable.18 '
However, the Court's actions will have a chilling effect on religious expression
within public schools. Because public school officials cannot determine what the
law is in this arena, they will logically avoid as much religious subject matter as
possible to avoid potential liability, even to the point of inhibiting a student's
religious expression. Before the new policy in Adler, the Duval County School
Board decided that students would have no right to speak at graduation, limiting
both free religious exercise and, more generally, free exercise of speech."'
While the Court has clearly pronounced that the Establishment Clause means that
a state cannot advance or inhibit religion,"' school officials who stifle a student's
right to free expression and exercise will be .doing that which the Court has
forbidden: inhibiting religion, not to mention free speech. This is the danger of
ad hoc balancing: it creates a de facto way for the Court to gut the basic tenets
of the Establishment Clause and, in a broader sense, the First Amendment.
Despite the Court's holding in Marsh, this danger should not apply only to
children and public schools. This limitation could apply to any situation; one
cannot know when or why because the Court has been so haphazard.
B. The Court Should Adopt a New Establishment Clause Doctrine
The Court's ad hoc Establishment Clause balancing should not continue. The
Court has created a maze of tests, qualifications, and exceptions that produces
little consistency and leads to confusion. Rather than providing a solution to these
difficult questions of law, the Court has only created more controversy. The U.S.
Supreme Court should look to two possible solutions, which combined would
create a workable Establishment Clause doctrine: (1) Courts should consider this
nation's history and tradition when interpreting the Establishment Clause; and, (2)
The U.S. Supreme Court should officially adopt the "Endorsement Test" as
outlined by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly."
1. History and Tradition Provide the Foundation for the Establishment
Clause
One possible solution to the current Establishment Clause dilemma lies in the
Marsh opinion. In Marsh, the Court looked to history and tradition and found that
legislative prayer was constitutional under the Establishment Clause."t Perhaps
the courts should begin to disregard Lemon and Lee, like the Supreme Court did
in Marsh and the Tenth Circuit did in Murray, and look to our nation's history
and traditions to interpret the Establishment Clause more precisely. Such an
approach provides a key advantage: although history can be subject to viewpoint
181. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
184. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).




manipulation, it provides all concerned with the Establishment Clause a
foundation that is less subject to judicial manipulation.
In Lee, Justice Scalia discussed the importance of history and tradition in
relation to the Establishment Clause in his dissenting opinion."' Justice Scalia
provided examples of how, "[firom our nation's origin, prayer has been a
prominent part of governmental ceremonies and proclamations."'" His opinion
discussed the religious nature of Thanksgiving proclamations given by the
President, the legislative prayer at issue in Marsh, and the invocation that opens
sessions of the U.S. Supreme Court to justify the strong tradition of public prayer
in this nation."" He then detailed the long tradition of prayers being delivered
at public-high-school graduations, dating back to the first public-high-school
graduation in 1868."
Justice Scalia correctly considered history and tradition in order to determine
if the Establishment Clause has been violated. However, the Court should not
adopt an exclusive history and tradition test to determine if an action violates the
Establishment Clause. It would be a mistake to presume that all actions conducted
in our nation's history are constitutional simply because they are a part of the
national "fabric," as suggested by Justice Scalia. Likewise, it is also folly for a
court to disregard those customs and norms that have become a part of this
nation's traditions, for these traditions should get the benefit of the doubt when
their constitutionality is called into question. History and tradition should be
reviewed as an indicator of whether an action has become accepted by the
American people as part of our national experience, but should not be the ultimate
test of whether an action is constitutional.
For instance, the Christmas holiday could prove problematic under both Lemon
and Lee. Every year, in presumably every public school district in this nation, our
children receive several weeks of vacation between semesters. While this vacation
time does provide a break for the children, the primary reason for the existence
of this break is to celebrate Christmas, a time for families to gather and celebrate
the birth of Jesus Christ.
Looking to the Lemon test, a court could find this holiday break to be
constitutionally suspect. Considering the first prong, it is arguable that the
primary purpose of the policy is not secular; rather, it is to allow all public
schoolchildren to celebrate Christmas, even those who are not Christian.
Certainly, such a policy's primary effect could also advance religion, specifically
Christianity, but perhaps even those of Jewish faith, since Hanukkah is celebrated
at approximately the same time as the school break. This would violate Lemon's
second prong. By allowing students time off, they are able to recognize the
significance and importance of Christmas. Moreover, non-Christian children
realize the importance of Christianity in this country when school closes for
186. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. d. at 635 (Scalia, ., dissenting).
189. ld. at 635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nearly a month. This situation could cause these children to feel isolated or
different. Could one argue that imposing such feelings on non-Christian children
actually inhibits their religious beliefs or lack thereof? The third prong,
prohibiting excessive government entanglement with religion, is more difficult to
find. However, if a court were inclined, it could argue that closing school
buildings and denying children a public education for one month to celebrate a
religious holiday could constitute such an entanglement.
Lee could also be used to eliminate a holiday break. While Lee concerns school
prayer and does not provide a general Establishment Clause test, one could easily
reason that closing a public school and denying all children one month's education
constitutes coercive action by the State. School children have no choice in the
matter. Even if their family's most important religious holiday falls in October,
they still must take their holiday break in December.
While arguments can be made that a Christmas-break policy violates Lemon
and Lee, it is hard to imagine that any court in the nation would make such a
finding. The Christmas break has become accepted as part of the history and
tradition of this nation. It is accepted, welcomed, and enjoyed by virtually all
schoolchildren, regardless of their faiths. A court may argue that there are
numerous secular purposes for such a holiday break, such as the bad winter
weather in northern regions of the country or the fact that schools want to give
students and teachers a needed break to avoid burnout. However, it is impossible
to argue that schools originally authorized the holiday break for any other purpose
than to give students time with their families to celebrate Christmas.
Considering history and tradition provides a standard, other than an individual
judge's own worldview, for a court to follow. One of the biggest problems with
the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that it provides no consistency.
The Supreme Court's doctrines in Lemon and Lee are malleable enough to allow
a judge to find however she wishes, and then to manipulate the Court's language
to fit her holding. By looking to history and tradition as a factor in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court could create an institutional "check" on judges. In our
legal system, which is built upon the concept of stare decisis," it is imperative
that courts use some consistent standard to make judgments. Otherwise, legal
continuity is lost. The law can be interpreted in different ways for different
entities in different courts. This is exactly what is happening today with
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: judges who desire more religious invol-
vement with government rule accordingly, and those who wish to strengthen the
wall between church and state make their pronouncements. While this type of
viewpoint discrimination may be inevitable to some degree, the U.S. Supreme
Court can take action to help curb it by holding that history and tradition should
be considered relevant to constitutionality in Establishment Clause cases.
190. Stare decisis is "[tjhe doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow





Certainly, the Adler policy is rooted in history and tradition, based on Justice
Scalia's recognition of the history of public-school graduation prayer.' Interes-
tingly, however, the Adler dissenting opinion also attempted to use history and
tradition to defeat the graduation speech policy." If the dissent can use the
history and tradition of the school district's graduations in an attempt to defeat the
policy, then those supporting the policy should also be able to use its history and
tradition to support such a policy, particularly if the school district wrote the
policy in response to previous judicial holdings.'93
History and tradition are an important part of this nation. The courts should not
disregard these factors when considering Establishment Clause questions. They
should look to history and tradition to determine if there is a national consensus
on an action that may help the decision-making process. However, situations will
arise, such as in Lee, where history and tradition support the action, yet it should
not be found constitutional. In order to make such a determination, the Court
should use an "Endorsement Test."
2. The Endorsement Test Should Be the Black-Letter Standard
In Lynch v. Donnelly," Justice O'Connor attempted to improve Establishment
Clause jurisprudence by modifying the Lemon test to create an Endorsement Test.
The Endorsement Test states that the government violates the Establishment
Clause if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a
message that "religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."'9 5
To apply the "purpose" element of the Endorsement Test, the court must ask
"whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion."'" For the effect element, it "is crucial . . . that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion."'' Justice O'Connor also
made clear that the divisiveness of a government practice cannot, without more,
provide grounds for finding the practice unconstitutional; rather, "the
constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the government
activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself."'
Based on its language alone, the Endorsement Test may not seem to be an
improvement over Lemon or Lee. The language is vague enough to be potentially
manipulable. However, requiring courts to look to the history and tradition of a
government action, in combination with the Endorsement Test, could provide a
more consistent doctrine. Justice O'Connor recognized this in Lynch. Discussing
the legislative prayer in Marsh, the governmental recognition of Thanksgiving as
191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
194. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
195. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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a holiday, the phrase "In God We Trust" printed on coins, and court invocations
as examples of relationships between church and state, she reasoned:
Those government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only
ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular
purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in
the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history
and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying
government approval of particular religious beliefs."
The Adler policy could clearly be found constitutional using the "history and
tradition approach" coupled with the Endorsement Test. The history and tradition
of graduation prayer is clearly established.' Additionally, the policy's language
indicates that the Duval County School Board wished to provide a student with
the opportunity to speak at graduation. The policy does not have the purpose or
the effect of ensuring a religious message would be delivered at graduation. By
permitting the student-selected speaker to say what she choose, subject to any
school-imposed decency requirements per Fraser, the Duval County School Board
did not intend to approve or disapprove of religion, even if the student gave a
religious message. Therefore, the policy does not violate the purpose element of
the Endorsement Test. Nor does the policy violate the effect element of the
Endorsement Test. After the enactment of the policy, some of the selected high
school speakers within the school district did not even choose to deliver a
prayer."' Thus, it seems ridiculous to argue that the effect of the Adler policy
is to ensure that a prayer will be delivered at high school graduations. Under the
Adler policy, a student could deliver a prayer if she chose to do so. Likely, the
prayer could offend some in the audience and could even cause divisiveness in
the crowd. However, as Justice O'Connor noted, divisiveness alone is not enough
to render a government practice unconstitutional.' The end result of the process
may be offensive to some, but so long as the process itself is constitutional, then
it should be allowed to exist.
The Court should adopt a new Establishment Clause standard so that everyone
in society, not just public school districts, can better understand the boundaries
between church and state. The current Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
anchored by Lemon and Lee, results in ad hoc balancing. Rather than perpetuate
these easily exploitable holdings, the Court should look to the history and
tradition of the government practice in question while adopting Justice O'Connor's
Endorsement Test as the black-letter law for future Establishment Clause
questions.
199. Id. at 693 (O'Conner, J., concurring).
200. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.




C. The Supreme Court Correctly Upheld the Eleventh Circuit's Decision
Although the Court needs to adopt a new Establishment Clause standard, one
must look to the Court's current clutter to determine the constitutionality of the
policy in Adler. Based on the Court's decisions, the Eleventh Circuit correctly
concluded that the policy in question is constitutional, and the Supreme Court
properly upheld the Eleventh Circuit's decision by denying the petition for writ
of certiorari. The Engel Court plainly held that a government-written prayer
violates the Establishment Clause, even if the prayer is neutral and of neutral
content.20 Engel reasoned that prayer is a "purely religious function,"' 4 and
therefore, the First Amendment's Establishment Clause is "a guarantee that neither
the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control,
support or influence the kinds of prayer people can say. '2 Clearly, the Adler
policy did not provide for a government-written prayer. The policy stated that no
employee of the State could have any role in the development of the student's
comments, if the student body decided to have a graduation speaker.'
However, if the Duval County School Board decided to allow graduation
speakers, but ban the speaker from expressing religious views, one could see how
Engel may be violated. In this hypothetical, the government would be attempting
to control, support, or influence prayer, a situation that Engel proscribes. 7 Such
a policy would violate an individual's freedom of religious expression and speech.
The Lee Court also provided justification for the policy in Adler. Lee reasoned
that "[t]he First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and
religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the
State."' It emphasized that despite best intentions, the Establishment Clause
"do[es] not permit school officials to assist in composing prayers as an incident
to a formal exercise for their students."2' The Court seemed particularly
sensitive to the reality that the school's role in establishing the graduation prayer
would create public and peer pressure on students to participate in the prayer, or
at the least, remain respectfully compliant through the prayer.1 It concluded
that this type of pressure amounted to de facto coercion. Should a student object
to the prayer, she would have to either remain silent contrary to her views or
protest by refusing to attend graduation."' However, the Court also placed a
disclaimer on the extent of its Lee holding. It stressed, "We do not hold that
every state action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it
offensive. People may take offense at all manner of religious as well as
203. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962).
204. Ma. at 435.
205. Ma at 429.
206. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
208. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
209. Id. at 590.
210. Id. at 593.
211. l& at 593-94.
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nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a
violation." ''2 The Court also proclaimed that "[a] relentless and all-pervasive
attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become
inconsistent with the Constitution. 1213
The Adler policy clearly falls within the dictates of Lee. The Duval County
School Board did not write a prayer, nor did it impose a graduation prayer.
Rather, in an attempt to be consistent with the Lee holding (among others), the
school board allowed the students to choose a graduation speaker, if they so
desired. Indeed, it is entirely possible that some in the crowd, perhaps even all
in the crowd, could be offended by the content of the student's speech. Such
offense does not mean that the school cannot constitutionally offer a process that
affords students an opportunity to speak, even if the student uses the opportunity
for religious speech.
If the policy allows the students to select any graduation speaker they wanted,
and the students selected the pope, would the school forbid the pope's speech for
fear that he may deliver a religious message? It would be difficult to argue that
anyone could perceive that the school endorsed the pope's message or that the
pope delivered his message on behalf of the school. Yet by choosing the pope,
the students would almost assuredly receive at least a quasi-religious message.
What if the students selected Britney Spears, a choice the school permitted
because she is not a religious figure, and Britney proceeded to deliver a two-hour
lecture on her interpretation of the New Testament? Should the school be liable
for the students' selection simply because the speaker gave a religious message?
There is no difference between these hypothetical situations and the Adler policy
except that in Adler, the policy permitted the students to select one of their fellow
classmates as the speaker. So long as he does not violate school policy, the
designated student should be permitted to speak.
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's advice to analyze Adler in light of Santa Fe,
the cases are clearly distinguishable. The Santa Fe Court expressed concern about
a student selection process with the sole purpose of electing a student to give a
religious message. The Court stated, "Santa Fe's student election system ensures
that only those messages deemed 'appropriate' under the District's policy may be
delivered.""'" The Court clarified that "nothing in the Constitution as interpreted
by this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any
time before, during or after the schoolday. But the religious liberty protected by
the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular
religious practice of prayer." ' The Court determined that while students
decided whether to have a religious speaker, the school district ultimately
designated the election as a school policy, and therefore the election comprised
212. Id. at 597.
213. Id. at 598.
214. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000).




an unconstitutional state action." 6 While Santa Fe and Adler contain similar
facts, there is one crucial distinction: in Santa Fe, the students decided whether
to have a religious speaker, and if so, who it should be;217 in Adler, the students
decided whether to have a fellow student speaker, and if so, who it should be.
21
9
The facts in Santa Fe constituted a situation where the State attempted to limit
a student's expression and speech to one narrow category; in Adler, the State
attempted to provide freedom to a student's expression and speech.
In fact, the most troublesome effect of reversing Adler would have been the
chilling effect on students' ability to think critically and to feel free to express
themselves in an academic environment. The Tinker Court clearly held that
students do enjoy constitutional rights of free speech and expression. 219 The
Court justified this holding on several grounds. First, the Court concluded that
"[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."tm The Court
reasoned that the school did not direct its policy banning armbands at students'
appearance, like a clothing or hair regulation; rather, the school unconstitutionally
directed its policy at controlling the expression of students."' The Court found
freedom of speech and expression to be particularly important in our nation's
schools, asserting a need for a free exchange of ideas and thoughts without school
(and consequently, government) interference.' Moreover, the Court emphasized
that "personal intercommunication" is an "important part of the educational
process."m Finally, the Court made it clear that such freedom of expression did
not merely apply to time spent in the classroom; rather, the educational process
(including the right to free expression) extended to any authorized campus
activity.' .
While the Court has narrowed Tinker in important ways,' none of those
restrictions apply to the Adler policy. Fraser states that a school can restrict
offensive speech, so long as there is a school policy forbidding the speech.' In
Adler, the policy in question does not proscribe certain types of speech; rather,
the policy attempts to encourage students' free speech by permitting a student-
selected speaker to say whatever she chooses. However, even assuming the school
district in Adler had an offensive-speech policy similar to the one in Fraser, it
would only narrowly restrict one area of student speech: vulgar or lewd content,
as defined by the school policy. There is a difference between offensive speech
216. d. at 311.
217. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
220. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
221. Id. at 507-10.
222. Id. at 512.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 512-13.
225. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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that offends others due to its inappropriateness, which a school can restrict, and
speech that offends others because they disagree with its content. A policy such
as the one in Fraser would have no bearing on whether a student could deliver
a religious message.
Kuhlmeier, also an interesting case, held that a school could restrict the content
of student speech if the school's actions reasonably related to educational
concerns.'n However, Kuhlmeier does not apply to Adler. The Duval County
School Board does not attempt to control the content of student speech. It offered
a special opportunity for students to select a speaker who would have the
opportunity to address her fellow students. The Duval County School Board does
not attempt to exercise editorial control; in fact, the Adler policy is constitutional
precisely because the school district does not control or dictate the content of the
speech of the student speaker. The only role the State plays is allowing the
students to select a student speaker for their own graduation ceremony.
Perry's discussion of forums also does not apply to the Adler policy. Forums
become relevant when the government attempts to control an individual's
speech.' Even if the Duval County School Board creates a public forum by
allowing the students to select a speaker, the school district does not attempt to
control the content of student speech.' Based on Tinker, a school cannot
control speech unless it materially and substantially disrupts a school's activities,
operations, or the rights of others. Fraser allows a school to punish lewd and
vulgar speech. Kuhlmeier states that a school can control the content of cur-
riculum, so long as the restriction is limited to a legitimate pedagogical concern.
None of these holdings would render the Adler policy unconstitutional.
D. Oklahoma and the Establishment Clause
While Oklahoma has yet to consider a public-school-prayer Establishment
Clause case, it presents the ideal example of why the U.S. Supreme Court should
adopt a new standard. If an Oklahoma court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals holdings, it would certainly have a wide
array of discretion to decide its particular case. While the Tenth Circuit seems
reliant on Lemon, 3 perhaps Oklahoma would utilize Lee's reasoning, since it
specifically addressed school prayer. Regardless, the inconsistency of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence makes it futile to attempt to predict an outcome in the
absence of specific facts.
V. Conclusion
Public-school prayer has been debated and litigated for decades. While courts
have recognized the impracticability of placing a strict wall between church and
state, they have also struggled to produce a clear, consistent doctrine concerning
227. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.




the Establishment Clause. When considering Establishment Clause issues,
specifically public-school prayer, the U.S. Supreme Court needs to modify its
current approach by looking to the history and tradition of government practices
and adopting an Endorsement Test. Continuing on its current path will not only
produce confusing and inconsistent results, it will also unconstitutionally inhibit
religious expression.
The Supreme Court properly upheld the Eleventh Circuit's finding that the
Adler policy is constitutional. It not only meets the requirements of Lemon and
Lee, it also obeys all of the public-school-prayer precedent. The Supreme Court's
ruling in Adler has only compounded the confusion. Because the Court did not
issue a written opinion, the nation can only continue to guess at the true meaning
of the Establishment Clause. However, at least for now, students still maintain a
right to speak that is free from content or viewpoint discrimination by school
authorities.
Ron Shinn
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